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1 GOVERNMENTALITY, GOVERNANCE AND CHINA 
 
 





Governmentality — a term coined by Michel Foucault (1979, 1991) to describe a 
rethinking of the notion of government — has become a key concept in the humanities 
and social sciences since the 1990s. Defined as ‘the conduct of conduct’, that is, any 
more or less calculated means of directing how we behave and act, the concept of 
governmentality has generated a proliferating body of work on the ‘how’ of governing: 
how we govern; how we are governed; and the relation between the government of the 
state, the government of others and the government of ourselves (Dean 1999: 2). What 
might be called ‘governmentality studies’ thus signifies an interdisciplinary approach to 
examining how the government of human conduct is thought about and acted upon by 
authorities and individuals, by invoking particular forms of ‘truth’ and using specific 
means and resources (ibid.: 1–3). 
 
The attraction of governmentality studies for western academics stems from the 
apparent need to explain the politics of the present, given the rise of neoliberalism, the 
decline of the welfare state ideal, the emergence of movements for indigenous rights in 
postcolonial settings, the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, and growing 
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uncertainties about the meaning of ‘Left politics’ (ibid.: 2). Several edited collections 
deal with the nature of governmental thinking in western liberal democracies and in the 
context of globalized capitalism, for example: Wendy Larner and William Walters 
(2004) Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces; Mitchell Dean and 
Barry Hindess (1998) Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of 
Government; Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (1996) Foucault and 
Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government; and 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (1991) The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality. There are also monographs examining matters such as: education; 
ethics and sexual politics; law; political theory; poverty and welfare; psychology and the 
‘psy’ disciplines, and the government of everyday life (Dean 1991, 1999; Hindess 1996; 
Hunter 1994; Hunt and Wickham 1994; Minson 1985, 1993; Nadesan 2008; Rose 1989, 
1996). The themes and analyses of governmentality have been further applied to the 
study of community policing (Stenson 1993), the regulation of pregnancy (Weir 1996), 
programmes of self-esteem and empowerment (Cruikshank 1993, 1999), and the nature 
of social work (Chambon et al. 1999). 
 
As a natural extension of this interest, the concept of governmentality has been used to 
analyze contemporary Chinese society and politics. Beginning with Michael Dutton’s 
pioneering monograph of policing and punishment in China (1992), the field of China 
studies can now claim book-length governmentality studies of the socialist work unit 
(Bray 2005), policing (Dutton 2005), population policies (Greenhalgh and Winckler 
2005), and prostitution controls (Jeffreys 2004). It can also claim a special issue of 
Economy and Society, a social science journal that is widely recognized for its 
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publication of Foucaultian analyses (Jeffreys and Sigley 2006). The issue includes 
articles on China and changing conceptions of governance, community, consumer-
citizens, new professionals, and the role of the media in enforcing ethical behaviours 
(Anagnost 2006; Bray 2006; Hoffman 2006; Jeffreys 2006; Sigley 2006a). Additionally, 
a growing number of China scholars have used the concept of governmentality as a 
framing device for discussions of the relationship between government and the 
everyday management of citizenship, desire, and identity, for example, through an 
examination of the politics of commercial television programming, gift-giving, healthy 
living, human reproduction, labour recruitment, and leisure (Anagnost 2004; Farquhar 
2002, 2005; Festa 2006; Greenhalgh 2003, 2005; Keane 1999, 2001; Kohrman 2004; 
Lee 2006; Powell and Cook 2000; Sigley 1996, 2004; Yan 2003; Yang 1989). 
 
This book contributes to the growing body of research on governmentality and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
embarked on a programme of ‘reform and openness’ in the late 1970s, Chinese society 
has undergone a series of dramatic, and some would say traumatic, transformations in 
almost all realms of social, cultural, economic, and political life. The PRC’s shift away 
from the centralized planned economy of the Maoist period (1949–76) was confirmed 
when the CCP declared, at the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, that its mission was 
henceforth to develop a ‘socialist market economy’ (shehuizhuyi shichang jingji). 
 
China’s transition from ‘socialist plan’ to ‘market socialism’ has been accompanied by 
significant shifts in how the practice and objects of government are understood and 
acted upon. It has led to the abandonment of the affective mass-line politics
1
 that 
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characterized the Maoist era in favour of a reconfigured version of ‘scientific social 
engineering and socialist planning’ combined with neo-liberal strategies of ‘governing 
from a distance’ through the development of new technologies of the self. The next 
section of this chapter therefore outlines some of the organizing concerns of 
governmentality studies and shows how they can be extended to include a consideration 
of governmental rationalities in non-western and non-liberal contexts. We then highlight 
changes in the nature of governmental thinking in reform-era China, especially the shift 
from a concept of government to one of governance. In conclusion, we summarize the 
contributions to this volume. These contributions show that China’s adoption of market-
based economic reforms has resulted in the emergence of a hybrid socialist-neoliberal 
(or perhaps ‘neoleninist’) form of political rationality, one that is both authoritarian in a 
familiar political and technocratic sense and yet also seeks to govern certain subjects 
through their own autonomy. 
 
Positioning governmentality: from Paris to Beijing 
 
Michel Foucault (1979: 5–21) contends that all modern forms of political thought and 
action are grounded in a particular way of thinking about the kinds of problems that can 
and should be addressed by various authorities, which he calls ‘governmentality’. Since 
the overthrow of absolutist monarchies in the eighteenth century, he explains, 
governmentality has become the common ground of all modern political rationalities 
insofar as they similarly construe the tasks of authorities in terms of the calculated 
supervision, administration, and optimization, of the forces of society, rather than in 
terms of the maintenance of power per se. That is to say, they all construe the ultimate 
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aim of ‘government’ in terms of improving the condition of a population, via the 
effective management of the processes that regulate its wealth, health, longevity, its 
capacity to engage in labour, to reproduce and wage war, etc. Moreover, the means that 
authorities use to achieve these goals are all in some sense immanent to the population 
itself. The concept of governmentality thus refers to ‘the ensemble formed by the 
institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow 
the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target 
population’ (ibid.: 20). 
 
Foucault’s method of examining government rationalities reconfigures conventional 
understandings of the nexus between government and power by decentring ‘the problem 
of the State’ — the tendency to reduce the operation of political power to the actions of 
a state, understood as a relatively coherent and calculating political subject. Rather than 
defining political rule in terms of a state that extends its sway throughout society by 
means of an apparatus of control, the concept of governmentality draws attention to the 
diversity of forces and knowledges involved in efforts to regulate the lives of 
individuals, and the conditions within particular national territories, in pursuit of various 
goals. In doing so, it intimates that power relations refer to the state not because they 
derive from ‘the State’, but rather because they have been ‘progressively elaborated, 
rationalized and centralized, in the form of, and under the auspices of, state institutions’ 
(Foucault 1982: 793). 
 
This undermining of the importance traditionally ascribed to the problem of the state 
flows from Foucault’s demonstration that the historically constituted matrix of 
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government has entailed the establishment and development of forms of power that are 
not exercised through simple prohibitions or controls (Rose and Miller 1992: 175). On 
the contrary, the government of society has been achieved via the administering and 
fostering of life itself, that is, through the establishment and deployment of forms of 
power (collectively known as ‘biopower’) that directly and materially penetrate the 
body. This background helps to explain the importance assumed by ‘sex’, for example, 
as a political issue. As a means of access to the life of the body and the life of the 
species, ‘the problem of sex’ is located at the junction of questions pertaining to the 
discipline of the body and the management of populations. It therefore constitutes a 
crucial target of a power or biopolitics that is organized around the management of the 
life of the individual and society as a whole (Foucault 1978: 145–7). 
 
Once the productive nature of this form of power is acknowledged, the concern of those 
who want political change to limit the reach of the state appears somewhat misdirected. 
Contrary to the popular construction of the modern state as an entity which was 
developed above individuals, by ignoring or denying their ‘true’ nature, the main 
impetus of Foucault’s work has been to expose the ways in which the personal and 
subjective capacities of individual and groups— their choices, desires, skills and 
lifestyles — have been both shaped by and incorporated into the scope and aspirations 
of public powers. Concomitantly, although Foucault contends that power is an 
omnipresent dimension in human relations, he demonstrates that the operation of power 
in modern societies is an endless and open strategic game, not a fixed and closed 
regime. This recognition implies that statist-based analyses are not so much 
unwarranted as over-valued. A far more important focus for political analysis and action 
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is the non-reducible relationship between government and the manifold technologies 
through which we have been historically constituted and, in turn, come to constitute 
ourselves (Burchell 1993: 268). 
 
The Foucaultian concept of governmentality also decentres the founding tenets of 
classic liberal philosophy by intimating that a political vocabulary structured by 
divisions such as state/society, public/private, government/market, and 
sovereignty/autonomy, is unable to adequately capture the diverse ways in which 
political rule is exercised today. Liberalism is usually portrayed as a political doctrine 
that is concerned with the maximization of individual liberty and with the defense of 
that liberty against the state. It is marked as a political philosophy by the assumption 
that civil society — a community of autonomous individuals who tend to be presented 
as given — places ‘natural’ limits on the legitimate exercise of power by political 
authorities. Yet liberalism simultaneously posits that one of the obligations and tasks of 
the state is to foster the interests and self-organizing capacities of the very citizens that 
are supposed to provide a counterweight and limit to its power (Hindess 1999). Within 
the discourse of liberal politics, therefore, power is confronted by a community of 
individuals ‘equipped with rights that must not be interdicted by government’ (Rose and 
Miller 1992: 179–80). At the same time, government is charged with the task of 
addressing a realm of processes which it is by virtue of the inviolability of those rights 
theoretically disbarred from acting upon. This contradictory framing of the role of 
government underpins the traditional concern of political scientists with the question of 
the state viewed as an exploitative and dominating force or else as a privileged and 
essentially neutral entity fulfilling necessary socio-economic functions. It also fuels the 
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conventional framing of policy failures and successes in terms of unjustified/unjust 
versus justified/just governmental interventions. 
 
Governmentality scholars question the founding tenets of classic liberal philosophy by 
suggesting that liberalism is better understood as referring to a mode of government, not 
simply a doctrine of limited government (e.g. Burchell et al. 1991; Minson 1993; Rose 
1989). They contend that the elaboration of liberal doctrines of freedom, which 
demanded the constitutional and legal delimitation of the powers of political authorities, 
went hand in hand with projects designed to make liberalism operable by creating the 
subjective conditions in which realms designated ‘private’, and therefore beyond the 
reach of political power, could learn to govern themselves. In making this claim, 
governmentality scholars do not redefine liberalism as an ideology disguising the state 
annexation of freedom. Their aim is to show that the celebrated sphere of individual 
liberty, whether defined in terms of the autonomous individual, civil society, or the 
private domain, should be understood, not as reflective of the natural liberty of the 
individual, but rather as a governmental product — an effect of multiple interventions 
concerned to promote a specific form of life. In advanced liberal democracies this 
involves ‘“making up” citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom’ (Rose 
and Miller 1992: 174). 
 
Until recently, the predominant association of governmentality studies with advanced 
liberal democracies has precluded a consideration of non-liberal forms of 
governmentality in both western and non-western contexts. Yet the period that Foucault 
(1979, 1991) attributes to the growth and expansion of governmentality is largely 
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coextensive with the processes of colonial expansion and administration, hence the 
government of subjects at home and abroad was and continues to be intertwined. 
Moreover, the focus on advanced liberal democracies overlooks the possibility of non-
liberal forms of governmentality, in this instance a socialist arts of government or 
Chinese governmentality, which governs not through familiar tactics of ‘freedom and 
liberty’, but rather through a distinct planning and administrative rationality, and which 
is nonetheless a product of the same processes that Foucault partly outlines in the 
governmentality lecture (ibid.). 
 
Mitchell Dean (2002) extends the original focus of governmentality studies by 
demonstrating that liberal government consists of both facilitative and authoritarian 
dimensions. The facilitative side can be summed up with reference to the idea that 
liberal government rests on the notion of free individuals pursuing their own interests. 
The authoritarian dimension involves acknowledging that liberal government requires 
the establishment of ‘specific norms of individual and collective life’, which constitute 
the desirable forms that freedom and autonomy take. These ‘norms’ in turn become 
obligatory and are enforceable (Dean 2002: 40). On the one hand, there is the explicit 
political dimension of liberal rationalities that are concerned with guaranteeing 
individual liberty; and, on the other hand, what Dean refers to as a ‘liberal police’ — the 
knowledges and technologies on which understandings of individual and collective 
norms, and the means of ensuring their realization, are founded (ibid.: 41). 
 
Barry Hindess (2001) further contends that authoritarian measures are not just auxiliary 
measures within liberal rationalities; they are actually constitutive of them. Hindess 
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(2001: 101) notes that the subjects of liberal political reason are differentiated in ways 
that allow for the ‘illiberal rule’, or ‘government through unfreedom’, of certain groups. 
First, some populations are viewed as incapable of acquiring the desired attributes of 
autonomy and self-government and should be subject to extermination, enslavement or, 
we might add, a process of ‘softening the pillow’.2 Second, some populations are 
deemed capable of realizing the desired capacities, but only after undergoing an 
extensive period of training and discipline (e.g. individuals or communities that are the 
target of colonial administration or characterized by ‘welfare dependency’). Finally, 
there are those subpopulations in relatively ‘civilized’ societies who are viewed as 
lacking the capacity for autonomous conduct due to external factors such as ill health, 
poverty, or lack of education, as opposed to innate characteristics such as those 
‘determined’ by race or gender. Hindess does not consider the ‘liberal government of 
unfreedom’ an anomaly or hypocritical denial of liberal principles. He argues instead 
that ‘freedom’ and ‘unfreedom’ are joined at the hip. In some circumstances, the resort 
to authoritarian rule is both a result of the commitment to liberty and an understanding 
of the liberal commitment to that understanding. Liberal rationalities not only require 
certain kinds of subject but also deploy a range of tactics, including ‘illiberal’ measures, 
in order to produce and sustain them (ibid.: 94). 
 
Such analyses can be used to consider how governmentality is played out in non-
western and non-liberal contexts — for example, China. In a chapter on ‘authoritarian 
governmentality’, Dean (1999: 147) notes that liberal and authoritarian forms of rule are 
typically distinguished on the grounds that the former governs through freedom, 
whereas the latter does not accept a conception of limited government characterized by 
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a rule of law that secures the rights of individual citizens. Dean (1999: 147) questions 
this distinction by suggesting that liberal government stands among the conditions of 
possibility of present-day forms of authoritarian governmentality, partly because 
‘liberalism is itself interlaced with forms of despotism for those who are deemed not (or 
not yet) to possess the attributes required of the autonomous and responsible subject’. 
Historically, the list of those considered not to possess such attributes has included 
indigenous peoples, women, homosexuals, and the delinquent (ibid. 134). This 
distinction is further problematized, we might add, in the context of present-day China 
where one-party rule increasingly is achieved through recourse to a rule of law and 
associated conceptions of citizenship, as well as through governmental interventions 
that seek to govern certain subjects from a distance, by relying on their individual 
choices, aspirations or capacities. 
 
Barry Hindess (1996) also implies that governmentality studies can be extended to a 
consideration of ‘China’ when he argues that there is neither a distinctly socialist nor 
liberal technology of government. As Hindess notes, the difference between liberal and 
socialist political traditions is often presented as clear-cut: liberal-democratic 
‘governments’ recognize the natural liberty of the individual and aim to defend it 
against external obstacles, whereas socialist and communist ‘regimes’ undermine that 
liberty in the name of collective interests and priorities. However, both political 
traditions adhere to the view that government should work through, and consequently 
must aim to realize, a community of persons who for the most part can be left to 
regulate their own behaviour. Additionally, both traditions have relied on the more or 
less successful workings of the diverse governmental devices that comprise the so-
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called liberal mode of government or governmentality. Hindess (1996: 77) therefore 
concludes that what these apparently competing rationalities of government have in 
common may be far ‘more significant than the obvious doctrinal points on which they 
differ’. 
 
China’s ‘socialist arts of government’ clearly shares a close genealogy with its western 
‘liberal’ siblings in terms of a concern with the biopolitical management of life, but 
Chinese governmentality differs from liberal western variants in its perception of the 
limits regarding what can be known about the object to be governed (Sigley 2009). 
Liberal reasoning is ‘sceptical’ about the possibility of knowing the object to be 
governed in detail and thereby employs an array of indirect methods of shaping human 
conduct. In contrast, China’s socialist governmentality, especially as it developed 
during the Maoist period, claimed that through the science of Marxism–Leninism it was 
possible not only to ‘know’ the object to be governed, but also to predict the precise 
outcome of any possible intervention. This totalizing assumption facilitated the 
implementation of more direct and coercive interventions during the Maoist period, for 
example, against certain aspects of the natural world and those designated as counter-
revolutionaries, in order to assure the life of socialism and the revolutionary people (see 
Michael Dutton; Lisa Hoffman, in this volume). 
 
The revolutionary and scientistic hubris of Chinese socialism has given way somewhat 
in the post-1978 era of ‘reform and openness’ to calculations and strategies which call 
for governing through market mechanisms and autonomy. As China began to integrate 
more closely with the global order, beginning in the 1970s with admission into the 
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United Nations, and especially after the adoption of market-based economic reforms in 
1978 and the subsequent repudiation of Maoist mass-mobilization politics, the PRC 
Government began to adopt different international accounting practices, forms of 
economic and social measurement, and so on. The social sciences, which were kept 
under tight political and ideological control during the Maoist period, underwent a 
significant revival in the 1980s as the central government called for the input of 
expertise into its ambitious plan for ‘social engineering’ (shehui gongcheng) and the 
‘construction of socialist material and spiritual civilization’ (jianshe shehuizhuyi wuzhi 
yu jingshen wenming). Working with key global governing institutions that have 
become synonymous with a global neoliberalism, such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, the PRC Government has launched its own programmes 
of economic rationalization and marketization in the fields of employment, education, 
environment sustainability, health, and so forth (see Feng Xu; Russell Harwood; Lisa 
Hoffman; and Elaine Jeffreys and Huang Yingying, in this volume). 
 
However, these new calculations and strategies have not completely supplanted the 
teleological ethos and imperatives of ‘scientific socialism’. In fact, the 1980s were 
witness to the reinvigoration of a planning mentality, most spectacularly in the field of 
population planning (Sigley 2004: 457–82); and, sometimes almost verging on 
‘scientism’, a wave of technocratic reasoning drawing upon, inter alia, systems theory, 
futurism, and corporate managerialism (Greenhalgh 2005: 253–76). Instead, these new 
calculations and strategies have become an integral part of the new technoscientific-
administrative Party-state — a mixture of conventional Chinese socialist technologies of 
government such as the ‘mass line’ and seemingly neoliberal strategies designed to 
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govern through the desires of individuals conceived of as consumers, property-owners, 
job seekers, and citizens (not as workers for the revolution). It is this combination of 
market autonomy and technoscientific administrative regulation that characterizes the 
‘socialist market economy’ and Deng Xiaoping’s notion of ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ (Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi). 
 
Governing the socialist market economy: from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ 
 
China’s official endorsement of a programme of ‘reform and openness’ at the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978 is rightly 
regarded as a major historical watershed of world significance. The year 1992 is also 
acknowledged as historically significant, but generally for the final downfall of the 
Soviet Union. The ‘end of history’ thesis that triumphantly accompanied the collapse of 
state socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has tended to 
overshadow two important events that took place in China in the same year. These 
events arguably have had just as far-reaching regional and global implications. 
 
In January 1992, Deng Xiaoping came out of semi-retirement to embark on a ‘southern 
tour’ of China’s Special Economic Zones of Shenzhen and Zhuhai, which were 
established in the late 1970s as export processing zones, and to the then somewhat 
stagnant metropolis of Shanghai. The purpose of Deng’s journey was to re-kick-start the 
reform process following the ‘loss of direction’ that had accompanied the violent 
crushing of student and worker demonstrations in June 1989.
3
 In the accompanying 
lectures to this tour, Deng called for greater boldness from Party and government in 
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implementing reform and opening up. They should not, he instructed, ‘act like women 
with bound feet’. Socialism, Deng continued, is not to be judged according to whether it 
is based on the plan or the market but on whether or not it expands and develops the 
productive forces and raises the standard of living. On the relationship between reform, 
opening up to the outside world, and changing practices of management and 
government, he said: 
 
… if we want socialism to achieve superiority over capitalism, we should not 
hesitate to draw on the achievements of all cultures and to learn from other 
countries, including the developed capitalist countries, all advanced methods of 
operation and techniques of management that reflect the laws governing modern 
socialized production (Deng Xiaoping 1994: 361–2). 
 
Close on the heels of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘southern tour’ came the convening of the 
Fourteenth Party Congress of the CCP in October 1992. In his report to the Congress, 
Party General-Secretary Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) capitalized on the momentum 
created by Deng, to declare that the object of economic reform was henceforth to 
construct a ‘socialist market economy’ (Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 1996: 
1–47). The use of the term ‘socialist market economy’ in this instance — its first use in 
an official document — represented a significant conceptual shift for a Party and 
government that had long upheld the superiority of socialist planning. It unleashed a 
flurry of intellectual activity across China as people began to discuss the implications 
for all manner of activity, including the practice of government. 
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Although governmental reform had been ongoing in China throughout the 1980s, Jiang 
Zemin’s endorsement of a market-based model for socialist economic development in 
1992 created an unprecedented focus for rethinking the very ‘function of government’ 
(zhengfu zhineng). Wu Jinglian (2002: 308), a prominent economist and formative 
figure in conceiving the socialist market economy, notes that reform of the system of 
government (zhengfu tizhi gaige) had previously remained limited in scope due to a lack 
of consensus as to where China’s reforms were heading. Wu does not suggest that the 
concept of a socialist market economy made the task of reforming the governmental 
system any easier, but he does imply that it facilitated a major reconceptualization of 
state-society relations and the role of government. From about this time, official and 
scholarly texts begin to engage in a wide-ranging discussion centred on ‘the 
transformation in government function’ (zhengfu zhineng zhuanbian) and the discourse 
of governance (zhili) begins to appear in associated policy statements (Yu Keping 2002: 
194). 
 
Attempts to rethink the role of government in the context of the socialist market 
economy were accompanied by a developing critique of the system of socialist planning 
and associated forms of government. One of the hallmarks of Maoist-era socialist 
planning was a system of quotas, rewards and punishments, and over-reliance on 
administrative commands. Commencing in the 1980s, critics of this system argued that 
administrative intervention was heavy-handed and had a detrimental effect on ‘relations 
between the Party and the masses’ (dangqun guanxi). As they argued, the target subject 
of the planned economy was viewed as a passive, dehumanized object of instrumental 
reasoning, whereas the market — through the mechanism of competition and individual 
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autonomy and initiative — would generate an environment conducive to forging 
superior citizens and enterprises. They further argued that the market had the capacity to 
link China to the rest of the world insofar as the competition between individuals, 
communities and enterprises at a national level is played out globally as a struggle 
between competing nation-states and transnational enterprises. In contrast, the socialist 
plan was a relatively self-sufficient entity, especially during much of the Maoist period 
when China was more isolated. 
 
Attempts to rethink the function of government in the context of the socialist market 
economy were therefore also accompanied by the redeployment of a ‘social Darwinian’ 
view of the world in terms of competing nation-states. Jiang Zeming’s report to the 
Fourteenth Party Congress on the nature of the socialist market economy is prefaced by 
a description of an increasingly competitive world in which the economy and science 
and technology are the foundations of ‘overall national strength’ (zonghe guoli), which, 
in turn, form the basis of competition between nations (Zhonggong zhongyang 1996: 1–
47). The report notes that nations around the globe and especially in China’s immediate 
region are forging ahead (i.e., the ‘four little dragons’ of Singapore, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and South Korea). The report also notes the significance of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world order. In doing so, it suggests that fast 
economic growth, not simply economic growth, is required because those nations that 
fall behind will be at the beck and call of other more powerful nations (shou zhi yu ren) 
(ibid.). It further suggests that the era of the planned economy and the form of socialism 
it embodied is over. China has to embrace global capital and develop strategies for 
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producing both docile labourers and active entrepreneurial citizens if it wants to be an 
important part of the new global order. 
 
As with general discussions about the shortcomings of government vis-à-vis the 
socialist plan, Chinese Marxist philosophers, once they neutralized the problem of any 
contradiction between ‘socialism’ and ‘markets’, generally agreed that the market was 
conducive to creating superior subjectivities. Lu Jianjie (1995: 22) states that: ‘A 
socialist enterprise must establish its own subjectivity. Under the planned economy, it is 
not an independent economic and decision-making subject, but an affiliate of the state 
… its subjectivity is very weak’. In contrast, ‘[the] socialist market economy demands 
that the subjectivity of the enterprise be re-made and its tremendous potential be 
released’, and that which applies to enterprises is equally applicable for individuals. Lu 
concludes that not only does the market create superior subjects, but it is also only 
through autonomy or ‘egoism’ (ziwozhuyi) that a ‘true’ subject can come into being. In 
his words: 
 
‘Egoism’ is the focus of the individuality of the market subject. Ego designates the 
market subject. It may be the individual’s ego, or the ego of the socialist 
collectively-owned enterprise and socialist state-owned enterprise with independent 
interest. Egoism means that the market subject seeks its own interests. Under the 
guidance of egoism, the market economic subject becomes pioneering, innovative, 
economical, adventurous, and outward-going. Only by acquiring these 
characteristics can the market economic subject realize its egoist goals and be a 
subject in the true sense (Lu Jianjie: 23–4). 
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Yet textbooks explaining the contemporary workings of government to Party and 
government officials stress that the establishment of a socialist market economy does 
not signal a retreat of the state: it requires a powerful (qiang you li) government that 
simply intervenes in different ways (Li Shouchu 1997: 96; Zhang Kangzhi 1996: 19). 
As they argue, the role of government in China must change to suit contemporary 
circumstances because the Maoist-era reliance on administrative commands to allocate 
resources and set tasks stifled the development of the productive forces and overlooked 
the potential utility of economic levers such as prices and taxation in shaping and 
guiding development. Centralized planning compartmentalized the economy and society 
into distinct areas, hampering flows of information and people, stifling competition, and 
ultimately making it difficult for Chinese enterprises to integrate with the global 
economy. Centralized planning also hampered the development of a spirit of innovation 
among enterprises and individuals, being based on a misconceived notion of 
‘egalitarianism’ (pingjunzhuyi). The textbooks consequently uphold the competitive 
mechanisms inherent in the market for weeding out inferior economic practices, 
creating greater economic efficiency and allowing subjects to become entrepreneurs of 
themselves and their own destinies (e.g. Li Shouchu 1997: 91–6). However, they 
conclude that the shift of the Chinese state towards more indirect methods of 
intervention does not mean that its governmental role is diminished. To cite Zhang 
Kangzhi (1996: 19): ‘Any attempt to weaken government power and function is very 
dangerous. In the process of establishing a socialist market economy the function of 
government must be strengthened [not weakened]’, even though ‘the kind of 
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strengthening that takes place must accord with and satisfy the demands of the market 
economy’. 
 
The development of the socialist market economy in 1990s China has thus encouraged a 
new form of authoritarianism for the market, one that has many similarities with the 
notion of ‘good governance’ as it circulates within advanced liberal societies and global 
institutions. The development of neoliberal rationalities in China and those abroad are 
related in at least four ways. First, the term ‘governance’, like the term ‘civil society’, 
came into widespread use in western scholarly and government writings of the late 
1980s and early 1990s through the policy texts of global governing institutions such as 
the World Bank and within the non-government organization (NGO) sector, and was 
taken up in China round the same time (see Howell 2004; Yu Keping 2002). Second, 
the rebirth of China’s social sciences has received a sizeable injection from students and 
researchers that have studied in universities overseas. The fields of economics, 
demography and sociology, to name but a few, have become conduits for new 
approaches to government as they diversify and strengthen connections with the 
international academic community (see David Bray; Feng Xu, in this volume). Third, by 
1992, agencies such as the United Nations Development Fund, the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank, had all been working in China on various development 
programmes for more than a decade. Despite the apparent ideological differences 
between these institutions and that of the Chinese Party-state, the scope for cooperation 
and the transfer of technologies of government was considerable insofar as they shared 
a common discourse of developmentalism (see Feng Xu; Lisa Hoffman, in this volume). 
Finally, the NGO sector has been steadily expanding in China and many of the larger 
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foreign NGOs have contributed, albeit with some limitations, to a changing mindset 
about questions of government (see, for example, Milwertz 2002). 
 
Yu Keping (2002), Director of the China Centre for Comparative Politics and 
Economics, and one of the key scholars responsible for introducing and translating 
foreign scholarship on governance into Chinese, specifically cites the World Bank’s 
Annual Report of 1992 — ‘Governance and Development’ — as a major catalyst for 
discussions on governance in China. In the mid-1990s, he argues, some Chinese 
economists began to take an interest in corporate governance and political scientists 
began to consider what good governance might mean in the Chinese context (Yu 2002: 
194). Yu further suggests that concepts of ‘government’ and ‘governance’ should be 
distinguished. Government (zhengfu) refers to the Party-state apparatus whereas 
governance (zhili) refers to the relationships between the government, corporations and 
communities. He concludes that the most notable difference between the way 
‘government’ and ‘governance’ are understood is in the operation of power. In Yu’s 
words: 
 
Power of government operates always from top-down to bottom-up primarily 
through orders, statutes, bureaucracy and coercion while power of governance 
operates mutually, interacting both from top-down to bottom-up and from bottom-
up to top-down, primarily through collaboration, coordination, negotiation, social 
networking, neighbourhood, identity or consensus (Yu Keping 2002: 195). 
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As the preceding examples suggest, neoliberal strategies based on collaboration, 
coordination, negotiation, social networking, neighbourhood, and identity or consensus, 
are now viewed as crucial to, but not outside of or separate from, the operation of 
(socialist) government in China. 
 
The incorporation of neoliberal strategies into the operation of government in the PRC 
is captured in changes to the Chinese terminology used to describe socialist planning. 
The conclusion of the Fifth Plenum of the Sixteenth Party Congress of the CCP in 2002 
was followed by a report that outlines the nature and objectives of the Eleventh Five-
Year Plan (2006–10). This document is significant insofar as when referring to ‘the 
plan’ it dropped the Chinese term ‘jihua’ in favour of ‘guihua’ (Sigley 2006b). Jihua 
was the term used to describe socialist planning in China following its inauguration in 
the 1950s. Guihua can also be rendered as ‘plan’, but unlike jihua, which implies 
detailed planning and intervention, guihua connotes regularization and overall 
supervision. The term guihua is thus much closer to the way in which government has 
come to be understood in the socialist market economy, while allowing a continued 
managerial and guiding role for the Party and government. 
 
The incorporation of neoliberal strategies into the operation of government in China is 
also captured in the official perception of the Party as moving away from being a 
‘revolutionary party’ (gemingdang) towards occupying the position of a ‘ruling party’ 
(zhizhengdang). In a volume dedicated to introducing the concept of ‘service orientated 
government’ (fuwuxing zhengfu), a concept forwarded at the Sixteenth Party Congress 
in 2002, Wang Jiangyu (2005) argues that the strategies and institutions formed during 
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the course of the Chinese revolution and in the early decades of the People’s Republic 
have out-lived their purpose. The CCP no longer requires the maintenance of the 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ through mass mobilization against ‘class enemies’. Nor 
does society need to be on an almost constant war footing through intense policing and 
state controls over all aspects of political, social, economic and cultural life (see 
Michael Dutton, in this volume). Wang concludes that the influence of the revolutionary 
period lingers in terms of an over-reliance on administrative commands and 
paternalism, even though society has become far more plural, fluid, and dynamic. 
Consequently, the Party must alter the way it governs in order to better manage that 
reality (Wang 2005). 
 
The President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao administration’s current overarching 
policy goal is to build an all-round well off (xiaokang) and harmonious society (hexie 
shehui) by the year 2020. There is no exact English-language translation for the 
classical Chinese term xiaokang, which evokes modest prosperity. However, it was used 
by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 to describe China’s modernization and was revitalized by 
Jiang Zemin in a report that he delivered to the Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP 
in 2002, entitled ‘Build a Well-off Society in an All-round Way and Create a New 
Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’. In this report, Jiang 
stated: ‘We need to concentrate on building a xiaokang society of a higher standard in 
an all-round way’, which means an estimated per-capita gross domestic product of more 
than 2,000 US dollars by the year 2020 (‘All about “xiaokang”’ 2002). The CCP’s 
vision of xiaokang socialism now evokes continued economic growth to provide 
prosperity, but it also sees the need for that prosperity to be broadly distributed and for 
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economic growth to be balanced with social equality and environmental protection (see 
Feng Xu; Lisa Hoffman, in this volume). Thus the goal of realizing an harmonious 
society, which was proposed by Hu Jintao at the 2005 National People’s Congress, 
stresses societal balance not solely economic growth and has been accompanied by a 
new stress on people-centred governance (weimin zhizheng). 
 
The crucial point to note is that within all this discussion on the changing function of 
government in China, the continued importance and necessity of the CCP is not in 
question. The CCP is the ‘ruling party’ and the one and only possible party that can 
wear this mantle, hence its cohort of 70 million cadres must be continuously 
strengthened, disciplined and trained. That task entails strengthening the Party ranks 
through the injection of new blood and new social forces, such as young professionals 
and entrepreneurs; disciplining errant and potentially errant members though auditing 
procedures, improved governmental transparency and ongoing campaigns against 
corruption; and training officials as professionals to better meet the new challenges of 
governing China in the twenty-first century (see Brodsgaard and Zheng 2006; Goodman 
2008; Shambaugh 2008). Hence to describe Chinese government as either ‘socialist’ or 
‘neoliberal’ is misleading. As the chapters in this collection demonstrate, government in 
contemporary China is a unique and innovative mix of technologies and rationalities, 
old and new, sometimes united to achieve common ends and at other moments in 
apparent states of contradiction and antagonism. 
 
China’s governmentalities: governing change, changing government 
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Chinese discussions on the role of government in the socialist market economy 
constitute a general critique of the Maoist system and a response to the challenges of 
governing in the contemporary context. The term ‘socialist market economy’ may seem 
to be a peculiarly Chinese Marxist notion with only domestic significance (i.e., as a 
‘market’ internal to China), but it links the PRC with the rest of the world in ways that 
were inconceivable under the ideological auspices of the ‘socialist planned economy’. 
On the domestic front, the market is seen as competitive environment that forges 
superior enterprises and citizens through a process of ‘survival of the fittest’ (you sheng 
lie tai). On the global front, the same form of competition is being played out amongst 
larger collectives, most notably nation-states, as well as transnational corporations and 
institutions. Questions of government, especially the links between the ‘quality’ (suzhi) 
of individual subjects and ‘overall national strength’ (zonghe guoli), feature prominently 
in this reimagining of ‘glocal China’, as the contributions to China’s Governmentalities: 
Governing Change, Changing Government show. 
 
Commentators often criticize China of the Maoist period and the associated system of 
centralized planning for stifling individual and economic creativity by blindly copying 
the ‘scientific socialist practices’ of the former Soviet Union (e.g. Ogdan 1989: 38: 
Wang 2005). In Chapter 2, ‘Passionately Governmental: Maoism and the Structured 
Intensities of Revolutionary Government’, Michael Dutton suggests instead that the 
early CCP put in place a planned economic structure, while simultaneously politicizing 
virtually every aspect of everyday life in a manner unique to China. This politicization 
was achieved through an endless series of mass-line campaigns, which mobilized Party-
led ‘popular indignation’ based on a question that Mao Zedong claimed was 
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fundamental to the success of the revolution — ‘Who are our enemies and who are our 
friends?’ This fuelling of popular sentiment took place in the danwei or socialist work 
unit, an institution that was meant to overcome the alienation of labour by merging life 
and work and to which an estimated 90 per cent of the urban population of China 
belonged by 1957 (Bray 2005). Work units provided all manner of welfare and services 
— hospitals, schools, housing, policing, shops and entertainment — to the committed 
revolutionary worker. Moreover, with the curtailment of the monetary economy and the 
geographical ‘fixing’ of labour to suit the requirements of centralized planning, they 
ultimately offered the only means of access to resources and rewards in China’s cities. 
 
Mass-line politics and the Maoist system of allocation coalesced to promote affective 
relations between PRC citizens and new types of comradely political subjectivity that 
were built upon an intensification of the friend/enemy divide. As people began to ask 
their friends, their neighbours, and even themselves, whether they were friends or 
enemies of the revolution, political stance became the determining feature of everyday 
life. Individuals and groups defined themselves by engaging in self-criticism (ziwo 
piping) and struggling against selfishness and revisionism (dousi pixie). People, streets, 
places, and even consumer goods, were named after revolutionary goals and 
achievements. Dutton therefore concludes that Maoism was a mentality of revolutionary 
government that defined life itself. Indeed, as most famously expressed during the 
Cultural Revolution period (1966–76), it was meant to touch people to their ‘very souls’ 
(Chang 1978). 
 
Governmentality, Governance and China 11,223 wds 
 27 
The PRC’s post-1978 shift to a socialist market economy required the repudiation of 
mass-mobilization politics and literally meant overturning the Maoist system of 
allocation and creating both a labour market and a new type of worker-citizen from 
scratch. In Chapter 3, ‘Governing China’s Peasant Migrants: Building Xiaokang 
Socialism and Harmonious Society’, Feng Xu notes that an estimated 130 million 
people to date have migrated from poor, rural areas to developing urban centres to look 
for work. These people were defined as peasants during the Maoist era because they 
engaged in agricultural labour and were tied to their rural place of birth by the system of 
centralized planning. Permitted some mobility in the early 1980s, peasant migrants 
initially were viewed as an instrumental aid to economic growth, that is, as a cheap and 
abundant source of labour to fuel the development of export-orientated coastal areas. 
However, they were neither expected to remain in urban areas nor to become permanent 
urban residents and their mobility continued to be constrained by the legacies of the 
Maoist era. They were subject to heavy-handed policing and administrative procedures 
and denied access to the housing, education and health-care benefits that were once 
distributed to urban residents through the work unit system. They were also stigmatized 
as ‘uncouth’, second class citizens and a source of petty crime (Solinger 1999). 
 
The Hu–Wen administration’s acceptance of internal migration as an integral 
component of national development in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–10) thus 
signifies a major shift in government thinking (‘Diyipian’ 2006). The incorporation of 
peasant migrants into China’s developmental goal of building a prosperous and 
harmonious society has entailed the adoption of neo-liberal strategies of governing from 
a distance through the development of new technologies of the self. These strategies are 
Governmentality, Governance and China 11,223 wds 
 28 
designed to turn ‘low quality’ migrants into active and productive citizens by providing 
a network of social services and information and trainings about labour rights and 
responsibilities. This shift corresponds to domestic imperatives and the ‘good 
governance’ strategies of the World Bank and the United Nations. The work of China’s 
sociologists, demographers and statisticians, and that of international organizations, 
suggests that without improved labour trainings and social services, urban-based rural 
migrants may become an unacceptable social risk in the future. While akin to a 
revolution vis-à-vis the governance of internal migrants, Feng concludes that the 
adoption of ‘neoliberal’ approaches functions in circular fashion not only to calm labour 
unrest and promote social stability, but also to bolster one-party rule by suggesting that 
the CCP is still the chief defender of (rural) migrants’ interests and without the CCP 
there will be no future harmony and prosperity. 
 
The Hu–Wen administration has further signalled its commitment to transforming the 
citizenship capacities of rural and ethnic minorities by providing free compulsory nine-
year education throughout rural China by 2010 (Quanguo nongcun yiwu jiaoyu jingfei 
baozhang n.d.). In Chapter 4, ‘Negotiating Modernity at China’s Periphery: 
Development and Policy Interventions in Nujiang Prefecture’, Russell Harwood 
examines the effects of implementing recent education policy changes and other large-
scale government development interventions in the Gongshan Dulong-Nu Nationality 
Autonomous County — a poor rural county, with a large ethnic minority population, in 
Yunnan Province. Ethnic minorities have been explicit targets of national integration 
policies ever since the CCP came to political power in 1949. In theory, this meant equal 
access to improved standards of living both during the Maoist period and in the reform 
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era. In practice, ethnic minorities in peripheral rural areas have tended to experience 
standards of living that are considerably lower than the majority Han population 
(Mackerras 2003: 56–76). 
 
While representing a radical and more inclusive shift in reform-era education policies, 
the provision of compulsory education to support the relatively new phenomenon of 
outward migration for work has coded new choices and forms of individual conduct 
onto remote and poverty stricken areas of China. As Harwood concludes, compulsory 
education is valued because only those citizens with the appropriate level of education 
and skills are considered eligible for labour export programmes and hence access to off-
farm work and upward economic mobility. Yet the dreams and aspirations to a better 
life that inspire individual students to become willing subjects of those same education 
regimes and national developmental goals are often frustrated and destroyed by the 
harsh realities of both poverty at home and urban-based factory work. 
 
The changing demographics of China’s cities and labour force have also obliged the 
PRC Government to rethink its strategies of urban governance. In Chapter 5, ‘Building 
“Community”: New Strategies of Governance in Urban China’, David Bray explains 
that economic reform not only resulted in a dramatic decline in the state-sector, but also 
led to the emergence of a more mobile, heterogeneous and economically independent 
urban population, as long-term urban residents moved to take up work outside of their 
work unit and rural migrants moved into the cities to find work in the developing 
construction and hospitality industries. The launch of a nation-wide campaign to ‘build 
communities’ in 2000 was intended to counter the disruptive effects of these changes by 
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establishing the residential ‘community’, instead of the former socialist work unit, as the 
new basic unit of urban governance. 
 
China’s new urban ‘communities’ are premised on a mixture of neoliberal and socialist 
rationalities in that they aim to develop more localized, economically efficient and 
autonomous forms of government, whilst simultaneously bolstering CCP support. 
Residential communities encourage and provide opportunities for urban residents to 
become involved in local concerns as ethical and caring members of a ‘community’. At 
the same time, they are still conceived of as administrative entities governed by 
professional ‘socialist’ cadres with some level of political, managerial and technical 
training. Indeed, a primary goal of ‘community governance’ is to bolster CCP support at 
the grass-root level by looking after residents with urgent economic needs and lifting 
the moral and educational standards of members of the community who are deemed to 
be problematic or of ‘low quality’, such as migrant labourers and the unemployed. 
Hence, as Bray concludes, the work of local community activists simultaneously 
compensates for government shortfalls in the realm of welfare and services, and trains 
other members of the population in the arts of governing the ‘modern communal 
citizen’. 
 
Residential communities and the subject formation of urban residents and visitors are 
being further shaped by concepts of environmental sustainability and ‘green’ practices 
in order to better secure China’s future. In Chapter 6, ‘Governmental Rationalities of 
Environmental City-Building in Contemporary China’, Lisa Hoffman explains how the 
localization of environmental strategies in the form of sustainable city-building is 
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helping to create new kinds of city spaces and subjectivity in the PRC today. For 
example, Dalian — once famous as a centre of industry (and pollution) — is now a 
model of sustainability and investment for other Chinese cities flowing from its success 
in achieving international and domestic environmental awards. In the mid-1990s, the 
Mayor of Dalian enacted a locally developed greening strategy based on Singaporean 
Prime Minister Lee Guan Yu’s ‘garden city’ model. This strategy dramatically altered 
the social and spatial organization of the city by relocating industry and hence industrial 
workers from the city centre in order to create an urban landscape that embraced 
modern offices, entertainment facilities and a ‘green’ aesthetic, i.e., plazas with grass 
lawns and floral plantings, commercial spaces and pedestrian shopping promenades. 
 
While initially criticized for displacing the kinds of enterprises and workers that were 
the bulwark of the Maoist period, Dalian’s ‘greening’ strategy ultimately was praised 
not only for its promotion of environmentally-friendly practices, but also for making the 
city an attractive site for investment and tourism, and a better place to live. Thus, as 
Hoffman concludes, the place-making practices that emerge from sustainable 
development strategies also shape the subject formation of urban residents and visitors. 
Citizens in reform-era China increasingly are valued, and conversely, ‘not-valued’, 
according to their capacity to appreciate and engage with the marketized strategies of 
green city-building and protecting ‘the environment’. 
 
At an even broader level, Chinese citizens are being brought into the terrain of reform-
era governance through the embedding of religion into the PRC Government’s vision of 
China’s development for the twenty-first century. As Susette Cooke explains in Chapter 
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7, ‘“Religious Work”: Governing Religion in Reform-Era China’, religion has been an 
aspect of CCP governance ever since the founding of the PRC in 1949, influenced by 
the historical legacy of state-religion relations in China but crafted through Marxist 
ideology which treated it as a social phenomenon destined for inevitable withering-
away on the road towards socialism. However, like many social and cultural phenomena 
released from the political constraints of the Maoist era, religion emerged with 
unexpected vitality amidst the economic development and social diversification 
generated by the post-1978 reform and opening up policies. China’s governmental 
authorities have subsequently re-tooled religious policy, and the specifics of religious 
work, to take more tolerant account of rapidly growing numbers of religious believers 
without relinquishing Party-state oversight of religious practice, or the CCP’s 
ideological commitment to atheism. 
 
At the highest levels of political doctrine, where Hu Jintao’s concept of ‘building a 
socialist harmonious society’ currently contextualizes the acceptable modes of social 
activity, religion now finds itself admitted to active contribution to the new national 
project under the guiding principle of ‘mutual adaptation of religion and socialist 
society’ (yu shehuizhuyi shehui xiang shiying). Within this social-management 
environment, the Party-state claims ‘legitimate management’ of any religious 
development that affects the public interest, starting at the fundamental level of defining 
which spiritual activities belong in the territory of officially-recognized ‘religion’, and 
which of these religious activities are deemed ‘normal’ by official state interpretation. 
As Cooke concludes, through its framework of regulatory mechanisms inside religious 
institutions — state oversight of institutional religious life extending to administration, 
Governmentality, Governance and China 11,223 wds 
 33 
doctrine and ritual, publications, education, and the appointment of personnel — the 
PRC Government is able to reach into religion’s heart. 
 
The recent provision of sexual health trainings to China’s citizens offers a final example 
of new governmental efforts to assure the life of the population by shaping the conduct 
of individuals and certain targeted subpopulations. As Elaine Jeffreys and Huang 
Yingying note in Chapter 8, ‘Governing Sexual Health in the People’s Republic of 
China’, sexual health is a recent and controversial issue in the PRC. Shortly after its 
accession to national political power in 1949, the CCP set about eradicating active 
venereal disease and the prostitution industry, claiming to have realized these ‘world-
firsts’ by the mid 1960s. However, coincident with China’s post-1978 adoption of a 
market-based economy, prostitution and sexually transmissible infections (STIs) have 
resurfaced and spread rapidly. The rate of domestically generated HIV infections has 
also burgeoned since the nation’s first reported case in 1985 and cases linked to sexual 
transmission outstripped those related to intravenous drug use for the first time in 2005. 
Acknowledging the potential for an epidemic, China’s State Council issued a circular in 
1998 stating that the unchecked spread of STIs-HIV poses a serious public health 
problem which could threaten national socio-economic development. A 2001 UNAIDS 
report on China’s AIDS situation more dramatically described it as a ‘titanic peril’, 
claiming that the country is poised ‘on the verge of a catastrophe that could result in 
unimaginable human suffering, economic loss and social devastation’ (UNAIDS 2002). 
 
Municipal health authorities have responded to domestic and international concerns 
about China’s escalating rate of STIs and HIV/AIDs by introducing large-scale, low 
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literacy campaigns aimed at popularizing sexual health education among the general 
population, and especially amongst subpopulations designated as ‘at-risk’. CCP-
affiliated or mass-line organizations such as the All-China Women’s Federation, the 
All-China Youth Federation and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, now 
conduct face-to-face education campaigns that target urban-based students, rural 
women, and male migrant construction workers, as part of ‘World AIDS Day’ activities. 
Corporate entities such as Futures Group Europe and Horizon Market Research, as part 
of the China–UK HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project, are turning condoms into an 
ordinary commodity to be consumed by China’s huge youth market. In addition, the 
PRC’s Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, with the assistance of UNAIDS, has 
published and disseminated a number of comic books that encourage peer-sharing of 
knowledge about STIs and HIV/AIDS among members of China’s illegal commercial 
sex industry (Zhongguo jibing yufang kongzhi zhongxin n.d.; Zhongguo xingbing 
aizibing fangzhi xiehui n.d.). 
 
The devolving of responsibility for the promotion and enactment of sexual health to 
individuals and multi-partnership organizations challenges the widespread view that 
power remans concentrated in an ideologically rigid and unchanging Party-state. As 
Jeffreys and Huang conclude, sexual health in China is now governed through 
cooperation with international organizations, the involvement of diverse state and non-
state organizations, and the cultivation by individuals themselves of the capacity to 
regulate their own health and behaviours. This shift away from the centrality of state 
control towards less direct techniques of governing suggests that the act of managing 
social change is changing the operation of government in present-day China. 
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Taken as a whole, the chapters in this volume contribute to a broader understanding of 
the significant shifts that have taken place in China’s contemporary rationalities of 
government. They also contribute to emerging studies of governmentality in non-
western and non-liberal settings by showing how neoliberal discourses on governance, 
development, education, the environment, community, religion, and sexual health have 
been raised in other contexts. In doing so, China’s Governmentalities: Governing 
Change, Changing Government opens discussions of governmentality to ‘other worlds’ 




1. During the Maoist era, ‘the mass line’ defined the relationship between ‘the leaders’ 
and ‘the led’ in terms of ‘from the masses to the masses’ and was upheld as the 
organizing principle of socialist government. It combined two basic but far-reaching 
strategies. On the one hand, local cadres were required to develop a close and 
responsive relationship with ‘the masses’, and also to use their knowledge of Mao 
Zedong Thought and Marxism–Leninism to adapt general policy to localized 
circumstances. On the other hand, ‘the mass line’ was used to mobilize the population 
for revolutionary struggle in the form of mass-mobilization campaigns, whilst 
simultaneously overcoming resource problems and countering any tendency towards 
bureaucratism and centralism within the vanguard Party. For a discussion of the PRC’s 
first nationwide campaign — the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries 
(1950–53) — see Michael Dutton, in this volume. The Great Leap Forward (1958–61) 
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and the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76) offer two additional 
and extreme examples of mass-line or campaign-style politics in action. Indeed, the 
PRC’s post-1978 adoption of market-based economic reforms and repudiation of late-
Maoist politics is generally attributed to the catastrophic failure and chaotic nature of 
both of these two campaigns. Although the era of mass-mobilization campaigns in 
China has now ended, ‘the mass line’ is still evoked in different and delimited ways to 
elicit public support for governmental objectives, for example, in assisting the police to 
fight crime. 
 
2. ‘Softening the pillow’ was a phrase used by white Australian officials during the first 
half of the twentieth century to refer to what they regarded as the inevitable demise of 
the indigenous Australian population and their perceived duty to make this demise as 
humane as possible. 
 
3. Following the crushing of student and worker demonstrations in June 1989, 
conservative ‘leftists’ within the CCP reasserted some authority over the affairs of state. 
Although the reform process did not come to a complete and grinding halt, the 
combination of domestic disquiet as China experienced the largest ‘rectification 
campaign’ since the Cultural Revolution, and the international opprobrium and 
ostracism that accompanied the crackdown, meant that the overall process was 
considerably stalled. This was accompanied by a largely non-public debate between 
conservatives and reformists (whilst recognizing that these labels are somewhat 
arbitrary) over the fundamental differences between ‘socialism’ and ‘capitalism’. Under 
these conditions, it was not possible for reformists to clearly and decisively restart the 
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reform process. Deng Xiaoping’s very public and high profile entrance onto the scene in 
1992 (the ‘southern tour’) was a massive state-media event and Deng’s insistence that 
‘reform and openness’ must not only continue, but also deepen and quicken, put an end 
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